We suffer, because we refuse to be reconciled with this lamentable fact; and even though we may say
that life is meaningless we continue to think and act as if it had a
meaning. Kafka's heroes (or hero, 'K.'—himself and not himself)
obstinately persist in making efforts that they understand perfectly
well are quite pointless—and this with the most natural air in the
world. And, after all, what else can one do? Notice, in The Trial, how the notion of guilt is taken for granted. K. does not question the fact that he is guilty, even though he does not know of what
he is guilty—he makes no attempt to discover the charge against him,
but only to arrange for his defence. For both Kierkegaard and Heidegger,
guilt is fundamental in human existence. (And it is only the Buddha who
tells us the charge against us—avijjā.) I should be glad to re-read The Castle when you have finished it (that is, if 'finished' is a word that can be used in connexion with Kafka).
*
About Kafka's Trial, as I remarked on an earlier occasion, it seems to me that the crime with which K. is charged is that of existing, and that this is why the charge is never made explicit. Everybody exists, and it would be ridiculous to charge one man with this crime and not the next man as well. But not everybody feels guilty of existing; and even those who do are not always clear about what it is precisely that they feel guilty of, since they see that the rest of mankind, who also exist, go through life in a state of blissful innocence. The criminal charge of existing cannot be brought home to those who are satisfied of their innocence (since judicial censure is worse than futile unless the accused recognizes his guilt), and also it cannot be brought home to those who recognize their guilt but who are not satisfied that it is of existing that they are guilty (since judicial censure fails of its intended effect if the accused, though aware of guilt, believes that the charge against him has been wrongly framed). To secure a conviction, then, the charge must be one simply of guilt; and so, in fact, it is in The Trial.
'"Yes", said the Law-Court Attendant, "these are the accused men, all
of them are accused of guilt." "Indeed!" said K. "Then they're
colleagues of mine."' (pp. 73-4) And this charge of guilt, clearly
enough, can only be brought against those who are guilty of guilt, and
not against those who do not feel the guilt of existing. But who is it that feels the guilt of existing? Only he who, in an act of reflexion, begins to be aware
of his existence and to see that it is inherently unjustifiable. He
understands (obscurely, no doubt, at first) that, when he is challenged
to give an account of himself, he is unable to do so. But who is it that
challenges him to give an account of himself? In The Trial it
is the mysterious and partly corrupt hierarchical Court; in reality it
is he himself in his act of reflexion (which also is hierarchically
ordered). The Trial, then, represents the criminal case that a
man brings against himself when he asks himself 'Why do I exist?' But
the common run of people do not ask themselves this question;
they are quite content in their simple way to take things for granted
and not to distress themselves with unanswerable questions—questions,
indeed, that they are scarcely capable of asking. K.'s landlady, a
simple woman, discussing K.'s arrest with him, says
'You are under arrest, certainly, but not as a thief is under arrest. If one's arrested as a thief, that's a bad business, but as for this arrest—It gives me the feeling of something very learned, forgive me if what I say is stupid, it gives me the feeling of something abstract which I don't understand, but which I don't need to understand either.' (p. 27)So, then, K. is under arrest, but he has arrested himself. He has done this simply by adopting a reflexive attitude towards himself. He is perfectly free, if he so wishes, to set himself at liberty, merely by ceasing to reflect. 'The Court makes no claims upon you. It receives you when you come and it relinquishes you when you go.' (The priest on p. 244.) But is K. free to wish to set himself at liberty? Once a man has begun to reflect, to realize his guilt, is he still free to choose to return to his former state of grace? Once he has eaten the fruit of the tree of reflexive knowledge he has lost his innocence,[a] and he is expelled from the terrestrial paradise with its simple joys. Having tasted the guilty pleasures of knowledge can he ever want to return to innocence? Can he, in terms of The Trial, secure a 'definite acquittal' from guilt, or does his case have a fatal fascination for him?
'In definite acquittal the documents relating to the case are completely annulled, they simply vanish from sight, not only the charge but also the records of the case and even the acquittal are destroyed, everything is destroyed.' (pp. 175-6)
'Definite acquittal',
in other words, is a total forgetting not merely of one's actual past
reflexions but of the very fact that one ever reflected at all—it is a
complete forgetting of one's guilt. So long as one remembers having
reflected, one goes on reflecting, as with an addiction; and so long as
one continues to reflect, one holds one's guilt in view; for the
Court—one's reflexive inquisitor—, 'once it has brought a charge against
someone, is firmly convinced of the guilt of the accused', and 'never
in any case can the Court be dislodged from that conviction.' (p. 166)
To reflect at all is to discover one's guilt. So, then, is it possible to get a 'definite acquittal', to choose to unlearn to reflect?
'I have listened to countless cases in their most crucial stages, and
followed them as far as they could be followed, and yet—I must admit
it—I have never encountered one case of definite acquittal.' (Titorelli,
on p. 171.) No, whatever theory may say, in practice having once tasted guilt one cannot unlearn reflexion and return to the innocence of immediacy, the innocence of a child.
The best one can do to ward off the inexorable verdict—'Guilty, with no
extenuating circumstances'—is to seek either 'ostensible acquittal'
(p. 176), wherein awareness of one's essential guilt is temporarily
subdued by makeshift arguments but flares up from time to time in crises
of acute despair, or else 'indefinite postponement' (pp. 177-8),
wherein one adopts an attitude of bad faith towards oneself, that is to
say one regards one's guilt (of which one is perpetually aware) as being
'without significance', thereby refusing to accept responsibility for
it.
K., however, is not disposed to try either of these devices, and seems,
rather, to want to bring matters to a head. He dismisses his advocate
as useless—perhaps the advocate in The Trial represents the
world's professional philosophers—, and sets about organizing his own
defence. For this purpose he recruits, in particular, women helpers,
perhaps regarding them as the gateway to the Divine (if I remember
rightly, this is one of Denis's earlier views—in Crome Yellow—that makes life so complicated for him). This view is clearly mystical, and is denounced in The Trial.
'"You cast about too much for outside help," said the priest
disapprovingly, "especially from women. Don't you see that it isn't the
right kind of help?"' (p. 233)
In The Castle, on the other hand, K. uses women to get him entrance into the kingdom of heaven, and perhaps with some effect; but in The Castle
guilt is evidence of the existence of God, and the guiltier one is the
better chance one has of getting the favour of the Castle (thus Amalia
indignantly rejects the immoral proposals of one of the gentlemen from
the Castle and is promptly cut off from the Divine Grace, whereupon her
sister Olga prostitutes herself with the meanest Castle servants in the
hope of winning it back).
In The Trial
the task is to come to terms with oneself without relying on other
people; and although we may sympathize with K. and the other accused in
their efforts to acquit themselves before the Court, actually the Court
is in the right and K. and the others in the wrong. There are three
kinds of people in The Trial: (i) the innocent (i.e. ignorant)
mass of humanity, unable to reflect and thus become aware of their
guilt, (ii) the (self-)accused, who are guilty and obscurely aware of
the fact but who refuse to admit it to themselves and who will go to any
lengths to delay the inevitable verdict (the grovelling Herr Block of
Chapter VIII, for example, has no less than six advocates, and has
succeeded in protracting his case for five years), and (iii) the
(self-)condemned man, who, like K. in the final chapter, faces up to the
desolating truth and accepts the consequences.
'The only thing for me to go on doing is to keep my intelligence calm and discriminating to the end. I always wanted to snatch at the world with twenty hands, and not for a very laudable motive either. That was wrong, and am I to show now that not even a whole year's struggling with my case has taught me anything? Am I to leave this world as a man who shies away from all conclusions?' (p. 247)For the reflexive man who retains his lucidity, there is only one verdict—'Guilty'—and only one sentence—death. K.'s death in The Trial is the death of worldly hope; it is the immediate consequence of the frank recognition that one's existence is guilty (that is to say, that it is unjustifiable); and this execution of the capital sentence upon hope is actually the inevitable conclusion to The Trial. I think you told me that you had found that K.'s death was an arbitrary and artificial ending to the book, which ought to have finished inconclusively. This would certainly have been true of Block, who clearly did not have the moral courage to face facts: Block would never have condemned himself to death (i.e. to a life without hope), and to have him executed by divine fiat would have been senseless. But with K. it was different: just as he had arrested himself by becoming reflexive, so he had to execute himself by admitting his guilt; and this is the furthest that anyone can go—in the direction of understanding, that is—without the Buddha's Teaching.
Footnote:
[a] Note the ambiguity, the ambivalence, of this word innocence, so close to ignorance, just as guilt and knowledge are sometimes almost synonymous. Adam and Eve, after eating the apple, knew that they were naked, and they were ashamed
*
What I
said in my last letter about K.'s reason for recruiting, in particular,
women to help his case—namely, that he perhaps regarded them as the
'Gateway to the Divine'—is excessive. It is true enough of The Castle, where K. is seeking God's grace; but in The Trial
K. is simply attempting to justify his own existence, and his relations
with women do not go beyond this. Here is an illuminating passage from
Sartre:
Whereas before being loved we were uneasy about that unjustified, unjustifiable protuberance which was our existence, whereas we felt ourselves "de trop," we now feel that our existence is taken up and willed even in its tiniest details by an absolute freedom [i.e. that of the one who loves us][a] which at the same time our existence conditions [since it is our existence that fascinates our lover][a] and which we ourselves will with our freedom. This is the basis for the joy of love when there is joy: we feel that our existence is justified. (B&N, p. 371)In The Trial, then, K. is seeking to use women to influence the susceptible Court ('Let the Examining Magistrate see a woman in the distance and he almost knocks down his desk and the defendant in his eagerness to get at her.'—p. 233). In other words, K. is trying to silence his self-accusations of guilt by helping himself to women (which does indeed have the effect—temporarily—of suppressing his guilt-feelings by making his existence seem justified). But K. is told—or rather, he tells himself—that this sort of defence is radically unsound (in Dr. Axel Munthe's opinion, a man's love comes to an end when he marries the girl). And, in fact, Sartre's detailed analysis of the love-relationship shows only too clearly its precarious and self-contradictory structure.
*
You will have noticed that my interpretation of The Trial
as the account of a man who, at a certain point in his life, suddenly
asks himself why he exists, and then considers various possible
justifications for his existence until he is finally obliged to admit
honestly to himself that there is no justification, corresponds to what I have said in the Preface to the Notes:
Every man, at every moment of his life, is engaged in a perfectly definite concrete situation in a world that he normally takes for granted. But it occasionally happens that he starts to think. He becomes aware, obscurely, that he is in perpetual contradiction with himself and with the world in which he exists.The Trial describes what happens to a man when he starts to think: sooner or later he condemns himself as unjustified, and then despair begins (K.'s execution, the execution of hope, is the beginning of despair—henceforth he is a dead man, like Connolly and Camus and so many other intelligent Europeans, and do what he may he can never quite forget it). It is only at this point that the Buddha's Teaching begins to be intelligible. But it must be remembered that for Connolly and the others, death at the end of this life is the final death, and the hell of despair in which they live will come to an end in a few years' time—why, then, should they give up their distractions, when, if things get too bad, a bullet through their brain is enough? It is only when one understands that death at the end of this life is not the final end, that to follow the Buddha's Teaching is seen to be not a mere matter of choice but a matter of necessity. Europe does not know what it really means to despair.
