...we defined the senses and the sense-organs in general as our being-in-the-world in so far as we have to be it in the form of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. (B&N, p. 325)In the Suttas (e.g. Salāyatana Samy. 116: iv,95) we find:
The eye (ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) is that in the world by which one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world.
Now whatever the respective meanings of these two utterances* it is
quite clear that despite the two thousand five hundred years that
separate them, Sartre's sentence is closer in manner
of expression (as well as in content) to the Sutta passage than it is
to anything produced by a contemporary neuro-physiologist supposedly
dealing with precisely the same subject—our sense organs and perception
of the world. This remarkable similarity does not oblige us to conclude
that Sartre has reached enlightenment, but simply that if we want to
understand the Suttas the phenomenological approach is more promising
than the objective scientific approach (which, as we all know, reigns
over the world).
Although the existentialist philosophers may seem close to the Buddha's
Teaching, I don't think it necessarily follows that they would accept
it were they to study it. Some might, some might not. But what often
happens is that after years of hard thinking, they come to feel that
they have found the solution (even if the solution is that there is
none), and they lie back resting on their reputation, or launch
themselves into other activities (Marcel has become a Catholic, Sartre
is politically active); and so they may feel disinclined to re-open an
inquiry that they have already closed to their satisfaction (or
dissatisfaction, as the case may be). Besides, it is not so easy to
induce them to take up a study of the Dhamma. It is worse than useless
to give them a copy of Buddhism in a Nutshell or a life
subscription to the BPS, which make the Buddha's Teaching easy...by
leaving out the difficulties. And even translations of the Suttas are
not always adequate, and anyway, they don't practise samatha bhāvanā.
I don't want to be dogmatic about the value of a familiarity with the existential doctrines; that is, for an understanding of the Dhamma. Of course, if one has a living teacher who has himself attained (and ideally, of course, the Buddha himself), then the essence of the Teaching can sometimes be conveyed in a few words. But if, as will be the case today, one has no such teacher, then one has to work out for oneself (and against the accepted Commentarial tradition) what the Suttas are getting at. And here, an acquaintance with some of these doctrines can be—and, in my case, has been—very useful. But the danger is, that one may adhere to one or other of these philosophers and fail to go beyond to the Buddha. This, certainly, is a very real risk—but the question is, is it a justifiable risk? It is better, anyway, to cling to Heidegger than it is to cling to Bertrand Russell.
It seems to me that, whether or not the Kumbhakāra Jātaka is reporting the truth, it does a disservice in representing enlightenment as something attainable without hard work. It is too simple if we can attain just by seeing a ravished mango tree; and we turn away from the Jātakas with the disgruntled thought: 'It happened to them, so why doesn't it happen to me? Some people have all the luck'. No, in my view, the emphasis should be on the hard work—if not in the life when one actually attains, then in a previous life (or being).
I don't want to be dogmatic about the value of a familiarity with the existential doctrines; that is, for an understanding of the Dhamma. Of course, if one has a living teacher who has himself attained (and ideally, of course, the Buddha himself), then the essence of the Teaching can sometimes be conveyed in a few words. But if, as will be the case today, one has no such teacher, then one has to work out for oneself (and against the accepted Commentarial tradition) what the Suttas are getting at. And here, an acquaintance with some of these doctrines can be—and, in my case, has been—very useful. But the danger is, that one may adhere to one or other of these philosophers and fail to go beyond to the Buddha. This, certainly, is a very real risk—but the question is, is it a justifiable risk? It is better, anyway, to cling to Heidegger than it is to cling to Bertrand Russell.
It seems to me that, whether or not the Kumbhakāra Jātaka is reporting the truth, it does a disservice in representing enlightenment as something attainable without hard work. It is too simple if we can attain just by seeing a ravished mango tree; and we turn away from the Jātakas with the disgruntled thought: 'It happened to them, so why doesn't it happen to me? Some people have all the luck'. No, in my view, the emphasis should be on the hard work—if not in the life when one actually attains, then in a previous life (or being).
You say, 'Questions that strike a Sartre or a Kierkegaard as obvious,
urgent, and baffling may not have even occurred to Bāhiya Dārucīriya'. I
am not so sure. I agree that a number of 'uneducated' people appear, in
the Suttas, to have reached extinction. But I am not so sure that I
would call them 'simple'. You suggest that Bāhiya may not have been a
very complex person and that a previous 'Sartre' phase may not have been
essential for him. Again I don't want to be dogmatic, but it seems to
me that your portrait of him is oversimplified. For one thing, I regret
to say, you have made something easy...by leaving out the difficulty.
Your quotation of the brief instruction that the Buddha gave Bāhiya is
quite in order as far as it goes; but—inadvertently, no doubt—you have
only given part of it. Here is the passage in full (Udāna 10: 8 and cf.
Salāyatana Samy. 95: iv,73):
Then, Bāhiya, you should train thus: 'In the seen there shall be just the seen; in the heard there shall be just the heard; in the sensed there shall be just the sensed; in the cognized there shall be just the cognized'—thus, Bāhiya, should you train yourself. When, Bāhiya, for you, in the seen there shall be just the seen...cognized, then, Bāhiya, you (will) not (be) that by which (tvam na tena); when, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) that by which, then, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place (tvam na tattha); when, Bāhiya, you (shall) not (be) in that place, then, Bāhiya, you (will) neither (be) here nor yonder nor between the two: just this is the end of suffering.
This is a highly
condensed statement, and for him simple. It is quite as tough a passage
as anything you will find in Sartre. And, in fact, it is clearly enough
connected with the passage that I have already quoted alongside a
passage from Sartre: 'The eye (etc.) is that in the world by which one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world'.
(i) To begin with, 'I---here' is I as identical with my senses; 'here',
therefore refers to my sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and
also mind). The counterpart of 'here' is 'yonder', which refers to the
various things in the world as sense-objects. 'Between the two' will
then refer (though Heidegger makes no mention of this) to consciousness,
contact, feeling, and so on, as being dependent upon sense organ and
sense object—cakkhuñca paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam, tinnam sangati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, etc. (Salāyatana Samy. 107: iv,87).
(ii) In the second place Heidegger says that 'here' and 'yonder' are
possible only in a 'there'; in other words, that sense-organs and
sense-objects, which are 'amidst-the-world', in Sartre's phrase, are
possible only if there is a world for them to be 'amidst'.
'There', then, refers to the world. So the 'here' and 'yonder' of the
Bāhiya Sutta correspond in the other Sutta to the 'eye (and so on)' as
'that in the world...'.
(iii) But Heidegger goes on to say that there is a 'there' only if
there is an entity that has made a disclosure of spatiality as the being
of the 'there'; and that being-there's existential spatiality is
grounded in being-in-the-world. This simply means that, in the very act
of being, I disclose a spatial world: my being is always in the
form of a spatial being-there. (In spite of the Hindus and Hegel, there
is no such thing as 'pure being'. All being is limited and
particularized—if I am at all, I am in a spatial world.) In
brief, there is only a 'there', a spatial world (for senses and objects
to be 'amidst'), if I am there. Only so long as I am there shall I be 'in the form of being-amidst-the-world'—i.e. as sense-organs ('here') surrounded by sense-objects ('yonder').
(iv) But on what does this 'I am there' depend? 'I am there' means 'I
am in the world'; and I am 'in the world' in the form of senses (as
eye...mind). And Heidegger tells us that the 'here' (i.e. the senses) is
always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, i.e.
something that is for some purpose (of mine). I, as my senses,
'am towards' this 'yonder'; I am 'a being that is de-severant,
directional, and concernful'. I won't trouble you with details here, but
what Heidegger means by this is more or less what the
Venerable Ānanda Thera means when he said that 'The eye (and so on) is
that...by which one is a perceiver and a conceiver of the world'. In
other words, not only am I in the world, but I am also, as my senses, that by which there is a world in which I am. 'I am there' because
'I am that by which there is an I-am-there'; and consequently, when 'I
shall not be that by which', then 'I shall not be there'. And when 'I
shall not be there', then 'I shall neither be here nor yonder nor
between the two'.
(v) And when
shall we 'not be that by which'? This, Heidegger is not able to tell
us. But the Buddha tells us: it is when, for us, in the seen there shall
be just the seen, and so with the heard, the sensed, and the cognized.
And when in the seen is there just the seen? When the seen is no longer
seen as 'mine' (etam mama) or as 'I' (eso'ham asmi) or as 'my self' (eso me attā): in brief, when there is no longer, in connexion with the senses, the conceit 'I am', by which 'I am a conceiver of the world'.
So, although it would certainly be going too far to suggest that Bahiya
had already undergone a course of existentialist philosophy, the fact
remains that he was capable of understanding at once a statement that
says more, and says it more briefly, than the nearest comparable
statement either in Heidegger or Sartre. Bāhiya, I allow, may not have
been a cultured or sophisticated man-of-the-world; but I see him as a
very subtle thinker. Authenticity may be the answer, as you suggest; but
an authentic man is not a simple person—he is self-transparent if you like, which is quite another matter.
*Where the Sutta says 'the eye is that in the world...', Sartre says that we (as our sense-organs) are 'amidst-the-world'; and where the Sutta says 'one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world', Sartre speaks of 'our being-in-the-world'.
Nanavira Thera (from letter)
The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. The 'here' of an 'I---here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this 'yonder'—a Being which is de-severant, directional, and concernful. Dasein's existential spatiality, which thus determines its 'location', is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The "yonder" belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-world. 'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'there'—that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the 'there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself. Heidegger B&T, p. 171
*Where the Sutta says 'the eye is that in the world...', Sartre says that we (as our sense-organs) are 'amidst-the-world'; and where the Sutta says 'one is a perceiver and conceiver of the world', Sartre speaks of 'our being-in-the-world'.
Nanavira Thera (from letter)
The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 'there'. According to the familiar signification of the word, the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. The 'here' of an 'I---here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this 'yonder'—a Being which is de-severant, directional, and concernful. Dasein's existential spatiality, which thus determines its 'location', is itself grounded in Being-in-the-world. The "yonder" belongs definitely to something encountered within-the-world. 'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'there'—that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the 'there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself. Heidegger B&T, p. 171
