Dr. Jayatilleke, in the second essay, represents logic. This is evident
from the way he turns the Four Noble Truths into propositions, or
statements of fact. That they are not facts but things
(of a particular kind) can be seen from the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta
(Vinaya Mahāvagga I: Vin. i,10; Sacca Samy. 11: v,421-24), where dukkha is pariññeyya, 'to be known absolutely', samudaya is pahātabba, 'to be abandoned', nirodha is sacchikātabba, 'to be realized', and magga, the fourth Truth, is bhāvetabba,
'to be developed'. A fact, however, is just a fact, and one cannot do
anything to it, since as such it has no significance beyond itself (it
does not imply any other fact not contained in itself)—it just is (and even whether it is is doubtful).
But things are significant; that is to say, they are imperatives, they call for action (like the bottle in Alice in Wonderland labelled 'Drink Me!'). Heidegger, and Sartre after him, describe the world as a world of tasks to be performed,
and say that a man at every moment of his life is engaged in performing
tasks (whether he specifically pays attention to them or not). Seen in
this light the Four Noble Truths are the ultimate tasks for a man's
performance—Suffering commands 'Know me absolutely!', Arising commands
'Abandon me!', Cessation commands 'Realize me!', and the Path commands
'Develop me!'.
But by transforming things into facts (and the Four Noble Truths, which
are descriptions of things, into propositions) I automatically
transform myself into logic—that is to say, I destroy my situation as an
existing individual engaged in performing tasks in the world, I cease
to be in concreto (in Kierkegaard's terminology) and become sub specie aeterni.
(By regarding the Four Noble Truths as propositions, not as
instructions, I automatically exempt myself from doing anything about
them.) The world (if it can still be called a world) becomes a
logician's world—quite static and totally uninhabited. (It is
significant that Wittgenstein, in his celebrated Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
which helped to establish modern logical positivism, starts off by
declaring: '1. The world is everything that is the case. 1.1 The world
is the totality of facts, not of things.' Compare, in this connexion,
the note in the Preface to Notes where it is said 'Things, not facts, make up my world'.)
Kierkegaard would be more severe on Dr. Jayatilleke than on Professor Wijesekera:
It is not denied that objective thought has validity; but in connection with all thinking where subjectivity must be accentuated, it is a misunderstanding. If a man occupied himself, all his life through, solely with logic, he would nevertheless not become logic; he must therefore himself exist in different categories. Now if he finds that this is not worth thinking about, the choice must be his responsibility. But it will scarcely be pleasant for him to learn, that existence itself mocks everyone who is engaged in becoming purely objective. (CUP, pp. 85-6)